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Abstract 
 
The primary objective of this note is to reduce the false alarms in multivariate statistical process 
control (MSPC). The issue of false alarms is inherent within MSPC as a result of the definition of 
control limits. It has been observed that under normal operating conditions, the occurrence of “out-
of-control” data, i.e. false alarms, conforms to a Bernoulli distribution. Therefore this issue can be 
formally addressed by developing a Binomial distribution for the number of “out-of-control” data 
points within a given time window, and a second-level control limit can be established to reduce the 
false alarms. This statistical approach is further extended to consider the combination of multiple 
control charts. The proposed methodology is demonstrated through its application to the monitoring 
of a benchmark simulated chemical process, and it is observed to effectively reduce the false alarms 
whilst retaining the capability of detecting process faults. 
 
Key words:  Bernoulli distribution; Binomial distribution; false alarm; multivariate statistical 
process control; principal component analysis. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Multivariate statistical process control (MSPC) is a critical approach to the monitoring of the 
performance of manufacturing processes for ensuring process safety and the delivery of high quality, 
consistent product. The basic procedure of MSPC consists of the following steps: (1) the 
development of a statistical model from historical data collected when the process runs under 
normal operating conditions; (2) the determination of control limits for the statistical model; and (3) 
the detection of process faults when on-line data exceeds the control limits, followed by the 
diagnoses of the cause of the faults. With the rapid development of automatic data collection 
systems, one of the primary concerns of MSPC is to effectively and efficiently utilize the large 
amount of data to characterize the process. This requirement has resulted in the application of 
multivariate statistical projection approaches, such as principal component analysis (PCA) (Wold 
and Geladi, 1987), partial least squares (PLS) (Geladi and Kowalski, 1986) and their non-linear 
variants (Choi et al., 2005; Zhao et al., 2006), to extract relevant process information, and to attain 
an enhanced understanding of process behaviour (Qin, 2003). 
 
The emergence of a large variety of MSPC methods in the literature has required some criteria to 
assess and compare their performance. In analogous to general statistical detection problems, MSPC 
is concerned with two types of errors. Type I error, also termed false alarm, occurs when a normal 
data point is classified as faulty, whilst Type II error, or missing error, is the result of the failure to 
detect a non-conforming data point (i.e. process measurement at a time instance) (Montgomery, 
2001). In the context of MSPC, an alternative definition of Type II error, the time delay between the 
onset of the fault and the fault being detected, is typically adopted to reflect the importance of an 
early indication of process anomaly. 
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The focus of this research note is to reduce the false alarms in MSPC. In Section 2 the motivation is 
presented through the discussion of the potential sources of false alarms in MSPC. Section 3 
proposes a statistical approach to reducing the false alarms due to the random effects (defined 
subsequently). In Section 4 the proposed methodology is applied to the monitoring of a simulated 
continuous process with promising results. Finally Section 5 concludes this paper. 
 
2. MSPC and false alarms 
 
The basis of MSPC is to collect a set of historical data when the process is running under normal 
operating conditions (NOCs). For a continuous process NOCs can be the steady-state around which 
the process is operated, whilst for a batch process NOCs are described by the trajectory of the 
process measurements and manipulated variables that ensure the satisfactory product quality. Then 
multivariate statistical techniques, such as PCA, is applied to the historical data to extract the low-
dimensional representation, and to develop the control limits for the monitoring statistics, the most 
widely used being the Hotelling’s T
2
 and squared prediction error (Q statistic). In the on-line 
monitoring stage, the monitoring statistics for the process measurement at each sampling time is 
calculated based on the PCA model. If the statistics exceed the control limit, then the data point 
(and thus the process) is detected as “out-of-control”. 
 
Once an onset of fault is detected, the next step is to identify the source or root cause of the process 
fault. The task of fault diagnosis can be achieved in a number of ways, including the contribution 
analysis that aims to identify the variables that contribute the most to the fault, statistical pattern 
recognition techniques and expert systems (Qin, 2003). The primary objective of this paper is to 
reduce the false alarms in process monitoring through MSPC, and thus the discussion on fault 
diagnosis is outwith the scope of this paper. 
 
The occurrence of false alarms may be attributed to a number of causes that are grouped into two 
categories in this study, including systematic model deficiency and random effects. Systematic 
model deficiency may be due to the mismatch between the statistical model and the process being 
monitored. A typical example in chemical processes is that a PCA model, which was developed 
using the historical data under one operating mode, is applied to monitor the process running under 
another operating mode. This issue can be addressed through the update of the model to incorporate 
new normal operating conditions, such as using recursive PCA (Li et al., 2000). Model deficiency 
may also originate from the violation of model assumptions. For example, the application of PCA is 
based the assumption that the process data is independent and identically Gaussian distributed. 
However in practice the process variables tend to be auto-correlated, necessitating time-series 
modelling approaches to reduce the resultant false alarms (Alabi et al., 2005; Kruger et al., 2004; 
Xie et al., 2006). Furthermore, in some situations the multivariate Gaussian distribution may be an 
inadequate approximation to the real process variables, and thus more advanced semi-parametric 
and non-parametric distributions are required to characterize the process normal behaviour 
accurately, including kernel density estimation (Martin and Morris, 1996), wavelet based density 
estimation (Safavi et al., 1997), and more recently the Gaussian mixture model (Chen and Sun, 
2009; Choi et al., 2004; Thissen et al., 2005). 
 
In addition to model deficiency, there are some random effects which may cause false alarms. Some 
on-line fluctuation of the process being monitored is inevitable, and this random fluctuation can 
result in the process variables being deviated from their nominal values, whilst the process is 
running normally according to safety and product quality requirements. More importantly, 
randomly induced false alarms are inherent within MSPC because of the definition of the control 
limits. For example, the 99% control limit, also known as “action limit”, states that statistically 1% 
of normal operating data will fall outside this limit, materializing in false alarms. This issue is more 
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serious when the 95% control limit, known as “warning limit”, is used since statistically 5% of the 
normal data points will be incorrectly identified as faulty. The presence of false alarms is one of the 
major reasons that the plant operators are reluctant to employ MSPC technology for process fault 
detection and diagnose. In industrial practice, a heuristic rule, though lacking theoretic foundations, 
has been suggested to signal the onset of the process fault when (1) two data points (within a 
specified time window) lie outside the warning limit; or (2) one data point exceeds the action limit 
(Martin and Morris, 1996). 
 
The primary goal of this paper is to suppress the randomly induced false alarms through the 
development of a statistical approach. It is assumed that the systematic model deficiency can be 
addressed using the methods reviewed previously, and thus will be not considered in this study. 
 
3. Reducing randomly induced false alarms 
 
This section presents a statistical approach to reducing the randomly induced false alarms. This 
approach was originally proposed in the literature of time-series outlier detection to differentiate the 
presence of randomly induced outliers from the onset of systematic process change (Abraham and 
Chuang, 1993; Chen et al., 2008; Singhal and Seborg, 2000). 
 
3.1. The statistical framework 
 
In general we consider a %100α  control limit that is used for process fault detection. Under 
normal operating conditions, the probability of the occurrence of “out-of-control” data points, i.e. 
false alarms, is equal to α−1 . More formally let ic  be an indicator variable to denote whether the 
process at time step i has been identified as faulty. Hence 
i
c  is a Bernoulli random variable with the 
probability: 
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We further consider a sequence of such Bernoulli random variables within a time window of size n: 
ini
cc ,,1 L+− . According to probability theory (Papoulis, 1984), if ini cc ,,1 L+−  are independent and 
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where im  is also equal to the number of ic ’s that are equal to one. The assumption of independent 
ic ’s  is in accordance with the assumption in MSPC that process data is independent. If severe 
serial correlation is present, dynamic techniques should be utilized to model the data, as discussed 
in Section 2.  
 
In the context of process monitoring, Eq. (2) amounts to assuming that at time step i, the number of 
data points being identified as faulty in the time window ),,1( ini L+− , is a Binomial random 
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variable as given by Eq. (2). Therefore a %100β  control limit can be established for im , the limit 
denoting the maximum number of out-of-control data points allowed, %100 βm , in a time window of 
size n (Abraham and Chuang, 1993; Chen et al., 2008; Singhal and Seborg, 2000): 
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where %100 βm  is obtained by calculating the cumulative distribution function (cdf), ), ;( nmF α , 
for m, and then selecting the maximum value of m that satisfies Eq. (3). Typically the randomly 
induced out-of-control data will fall within this limit, whereas the limit being exceeded will indicate 
the onset of a process fault requiring operators’ attention. By utilizing the property of the Bernoulli 
and Binomial distributions in conjunction with MSPC, the proposed method will be able to reduce 
the false alarms induced by random effects, whilst attaining fault detection capability. For the 
reason of clarity, %100α  will be referred to as “MSPC control limit” and %100 βm  as “second-level 
control limit” onwards. 
 
In summary the proposed approach executes as follows: 
 
1. At time step i, apply PCA to the process measurement and calculate the T2 statistic. For 
clarity of presentation we consider a single monitoring statistic. The extension to multiple 
statistics is discussed in the next sub-section. 
2. If the %100α  control limit for T2 is violated, then count the number of data points that 
violated the %100α  limit in the past n time steps (including current time); 
• If this number exceeds the second-level control limit %100 βm , then an onset of 
process fault is detected; 
• Else the process is classified as under normal operating conditions. 
 Else the process is classified as under normal operating conditions. 
 
To implement the second-level control limit based on the Binomial distribution, there are several 
parameters to be determined, including β  and n. Following the suggestions in the literature of 
outlier detection (Abraham and Chuang, 1993; Chen et al., 2008; Singhal and Seborg, 2000), the 
second-level control limit, β , is typically taken as 0.99. The selection of the window size n must 
ensure that there is at least one out-of-control data point allowed in this window, i.e. 1%100 ≥βm , 
since 0%100 =βm  is equivalent to using the conventional MSPC. On the other side, the window size 
should be relatively small to keep a small value of %100 βm , and hence to attain a sufficient 
sensitivity to the real process faults. According to Eq. (3), %100 βm  is also dependent on the value of 
the MSPC control limit, %100α . Table 1 gives the value of %99m  at different window size and α , 
where it appears that a window size of 20 is a good choice to satisfy these requirements for both 
95% and 99% MSPC control limit, and this value will be used in this study. Nevertheless, the 
choice of a proper window size is rather subjective. Alternatively, if available, historical faulty data 
may be used to evaluate the impact of window size on the sensitivity of fault detection, and this 
information is highly valuable to select a sensible window size. 
 
(Table 1 about here) 
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3.2. Extension to multiple control charts 
 
The above strategy can be extended to consider multiple control charts simultaneously, such as the 
combination of charts for T
2
 and Q statistics that are widely used in conjunction with PCA and PLS 
models. When multiple MSPC control limits, corresponding to multiple charts, are utilized, the 
process can be identified as faulty when any of the control limits is exceeded (Chen and Sun, 2009), 
since the control charts typically characterize different aspects of the process and thus are 
complementary. For example, in the application of PCA model, T
2
 monitors the covariance 
structure of process variables, whereas the Q statistic ensures a small magnitude of prediction errors. 
To derive the second-level control limits for the combination of T
2
 and Q statistics, two events are 
defined: 
• Event A: The control limit of T2 is exceeded; 
• Event B: The control limit of the Q statistic is exceeded. 
Therefore the probability of either of the two events happens is: 
 
)()()()( BAPBPAPBAP ∩−+=∪  (4) 
 
By assuming the MSPC control limits are the same for both statistics ( %100)()( α== BPAP ), 
and the two events are independent (
2)()()( α==∩ BPAPBAP ), Eq. (4) can be calculated 
analytically as: 
22)( αα −=∪ BAP . Alternatively )( BAP ∪  can be calculated empirically as 
follows. We can first calculate T
2
 and Q statistics of the nominal process data that are used for the 
development of the PCA model, and then set )( BAP ∪  as the frequency of either Event A or B 
happens within the nominal data set. In this study, simulation results have found that the two ways 
of calculating )( BAP ∪  give similar values (not reported), and thus the independence assumption 
is reasonable. In the case study presented in Section 4, the analytical calculation, i.e. 
22)( αα −=∪ BAP ,  is adopted. 
 
In analogous to the discussion in Section 3.1, the joint event, BA ∪ , conforms to a Bernoulli 
distribution with the parameter α  in Eq. (1) being replaced by 22 αα − . Therefore the second-
level control limit can be constructed for multiple charts as presented in Section 3.1. The extension 
of this strategy to more than two control charts is straightforward and is neglected here. Table 2 
gives the value of %99m  at different window size and α  for two control charts, where it appears 
that a reasonable choice of window size can be:  n=15 when 95.0=α , and n=20 when 99.0=α . 
 
(Table 2 about here) 
 
4. Case study 
 
4.1. The Tennessee Eastman Process 
 
The Tennessee Eastman process (Downs and Vogel, 1993) was provided as a benchmark for testing 
new methodologies in advanced process control and process performance monitoring. It has been 
implemented in Matlab Simulink environment and used extensively in the literature of MSPC 
(Kruger et al., 2004). The process comprises a set of unit operations 
(reactor/separator/stripper/compressor) with two simultaneous exothermic reactions and two by-
product reactions. In this study, the simulation software is run under the base mode (mode 1) with a 
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decentralized control strategy (Ricker, 1996). The process has 12 manipulated variables and 41 
measurements. However a number of the quality measurements, such as product concentration, are 
only available infrequently in industrial scale plant and hence were removed from the analysis. 
Thus the final data set that was used to build the model comprised 22 measurements, plus 12 
manipulated variables. The details of these 34 variables can be found in (Downs and Vogel, 1993). 
The sampling interval was 0.02 h. 
 
To evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed approach, five faulty types are considered, as listed in 
Table 3. From previous analyses that have been reported in the literature, it is acknowledged that 
fault “IDV(1)” and “IDV(4)” results in a direct step change in process measurements and thus are 
relatively easy to detect. Fault “IDV(14)” is related to a sticky valve for reactor cooling water, and 
the disturbance is expected to be reflected in the reactor temperature measurement. In contrast fault 
“IDV(10)” is more subtle as it disturbs the reactant feed temperature which was not directly 
measured. Finally “IDV(12+15)” is the most complicated, as it reflects the simultaneous onset of 
two faults, a disturbance in an unmeasured variable and a device fault, and thus it is challenging to 
detect. For each fault scenario the process was initially run for 20 hours under normal operating 
conditions, giving 1000 data points, each being a vector of 34 dimensions. The first 500 data were 
selected to define the nominal operating region, and the remaining 500 data points were reserved to 
assess the false alarm rate. The process was then run under the conditions that simulated faulty 
behaviour for a further 4 hours, giving 200 faulty data points. Note the benchmark simulation 
software encapsulates the details of implementation and it automatically determines the magnitude 
of measurement noise and faulty signal according to the typical process operations (Downs and 
Vogel, 1993). 
 
(Table 3 about here) 
 
4.2. Results and Discussions 
 
The data set is pre-processed to have zero mean and unit standard deviation at each variable. Then 
PCA was performed on the pre-processed nominal data set (500 data points), and the number of 
principal components retained is determined using five-fold cross-validation. We first investigate 
the monitoring charts for fault “IDV(12+15)” as shown in Figure 1, where the fault was introduced 
at time point 20 h and the 95% MSPC control limit was utilized. It is clearly seen that prior to the 
introduction of the process fault, there are a significant number of false alarms for both T
2
 and Q 
statistics, with false alarm rates being 2.8% and 8.6% respectively. Typically a small false alarm 
rate implies that the control chart tends to be less sensitive to process fault, and it may result in large 
detection delay. This phenomenon has been observed in this example, where the detection delays 
for T
2
 and Q statistics are 0.30 h and 0.12 h respectively, i.e. T
2
 gives fewer false alarms but is less 
sensitive to the process fault than the Q statistic does. 
 
(Figure 1 about here) 
 
Figure 2 depicts the monitoring charts for fault “IDV(12+15)” using the second-level control limit 
for the number of out-of-control data points within a window of 20 time steps as described in 
Section 3. Compared with Figure 1, the salient feature of Figure 2 is that the number of false alarms 
has been significantly reduced for both T
2
 and Q control charts: the corresponding false alarm rates 
have dropped to 0.4% (from 2.8%) and 0.8% (from 8.6%). Furthermore, the reduction of false 
alarms has not significantly sacrificed the detection delay, where the delay is increased from 0.30 h 
to 0.36 h for T
2
, but not changed (both are 0.12 h) for the Q statistic.  
 
(Figure 2 about here) 
 7 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the use of a second-level control limit to combine T
2
 and Q control charts for 
fault “IDV(12+15)”, where again most of the false alarms have been eliminated without significant 
impact on the detection delay. The false alarm rate has been reduced from 10.6% to 0.4% whilst the 
detection delay is increased from 0.12 h to 0.14 h. The relatively high false alarm rate associated 
with multiple charts is because the process is identified as abnormal when either chart indicates so. 
Therefore the proposed approach is especially applicable in the situation of multiple charts that are 
widely used in the implementation of MSPC techniques. 
 
(Figure 3 about here) 
 
Table 4 and 5 summarize the monitoring results for all the five faulty scenarios using 95% and 99% 
MSPC control limits, respectively. In all cases the proposed second level control limit effectively 
suppresses the false alarms. When using the 95% MSPC control limit, on average the false alarm 
rates are decreased from 8.7% to 2.0% with the detection delay being marginally increased from 
0.17 h to 0.20 h. It could be argued that false alarms can be suppressed by simply choosing the 99% 
MSPC control limit. However in practice, given a set of nominal process data, it is more reliable to 
estimate the 95% control limit than the 99% limit, since the estimation of a “rare event” such as the 
99% control limit is highly sensitive to small change in the data (Rychlik and Ryden, 2006). In 
addition, the use of 99% control limit could result in significantly longer detection delay. For 
example the detection delay for fault “IDV(12+15)”, using combined T
2
 and Q statistics, is 0.12 h 
for 95% limit but 0.30 h for 99% limit. Therefore the choice of the two control limits is dependent 
on practical requirements and they are typically considered together to keep a balance between 
robustness (fewer false alarms) and sensitivity (shorter detection delay). However even if 99% 
MSPC control limit is desirable and utilized, Table 5 shows that by utilizing the proposed approach, 
the false alarm rates can still be reduced from 2.2% to 0.8% on average, with the detection delay 
being slightly increased from 0.23 h to 0.24 h. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This paper proposes a statistical approach to reducing the false alarms in multivariate statistical 
process control. While there are many potential causes of false alarms, this study is focused on 
those induced by random effects. The central component of this statistical approach is to construct a 
second-level control limit that is based on the known properties of Bernoulli and Binomial 
distributions. The proposed methodology is simple in its concept, straightforward to implement, 
effective in reducing the false alarms, and capable of retaining the fault detection power of the 
original MSPC methods. Besides the conventional PCA based method, this statistical framework is 
generally applicable to other process monitoring techniques, including the dynamic and mixture 
models reviewed in Section 2. 
 
In practice, a potential limitation of the proposed methodology is that the use of a time window may 
result in significant detection delay for processes with very low rate of data collecting, such as some 
batch fermentation processes. For example, if the sampling rate of the process is one hour, a 
detection delay of one data point (corresponding to 0.02 h in the case study in Section 4) turns out 
to be 1 h, and thus is highly undesirable. Alternative approaches for these “slow” processes should 
be utilized and they are under investigation. 
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Figure 1: Process monitoring charts for (a) T
2
 and (b) Q statistics, where the fault was introduced at 
20 h. 
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Figure 2: Process monitoring using the second-level control limit for : (a) T
2
 and (b) Q statistics, 
where the fault was introduced at 20 h. 
 
10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
Time (h)
m
m99%
 
 
Figure 3: Process monitoring using the second-level control limit for the combination of T
2
 and Q 
statistics, where the fault was introduced at 20 h. 
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Table 1: The second-level control limit, %99m , at different window size (n) and the MSPC control 
limit ( %100α ). 
 
%100α  n = 5 10 15 20 25 30 
95% 1 2 2 3 3 4 
99% 0 0 0 1 1 1 
 
 
 
Table 2: The second-level control limit, %99m , at different window size (n) and the MSPC control 
limit ( %100α ) for the combination of two control charts. 
 
%100α  n = 5 10 15 20 25 30 
95% 1 3 4 4 5 6 
99% 0 0 0 1 2 2 
 
 
 
Table 3: Process faults. 
 
Case Disturbance 
IDV(1) A/C  feed ratio (step change) 
IDV(4) Reactor cooling water inlet temperature (step change) 
IDV(10) C feed temperature (random variation) 
IDV(14) Reactor cooling water valve (sticking) 
IDV(12+15) Condenser cooling water inlet temperature (random variation) 
and condenser cooling water valve (sticking) 
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Table 4: Process monitoring results by using 95% MSPC control limit (i.e. %95%100 =α ). 
 
Case 
 False Alarm (%) Detection Delay (h) 
 MSPC MSPC + 2nd level MSPC MSPC + 2nd level 
IDV(1) T
2
 2.2 0.0 0.10 0.14 
 Q 9.0 2.4 0.06 0.10 
 T
2
 + Q 11.0 0.8 0.06 0.06 
IDV(4) T
2
 5.6 3.4 0.04 0.04 
 Q 12.2 5.4 0.04 0.06 
 T
2
 + Q 16.8 7.8 0.04 0.04 
IDV(10) T
2
 2.6 1.6 0.56 0.66 
 Q 10.0 2.4 0.46 0.52 
 T
2
 + Q 12.4 1.0 0.46 0.52 
IDV(14) T
2
 4.4 0.2 0.08 0.14 
 Q 9.4 2.2 0.06 0.06 
 T
2
 + Q 13.2 1.0 0.06 0.08 
IDV(12+15) T
2
 2.8 0.8 0.30 0.36 
 Q 8.6 0.4 0.12 0.12 
 T
2
 + Q 10.6 0.4 0.12 0.14 
Average  8.7 2.0 0.17 0.20 
 
 
 
Table 5: Process monitoring results by using 99% MSPC control limit (i.e. %99%100 =α ). 
 
Case 
 False Alarm (%) Detection Delay (h) 
 MSPC MSPC + 2nd level MSPC MSPC + 2nd level 
IDV(1) T
2
 0.4 0.0 0.10 0.10 
 Q 2.0 0.6 0.08 0.10 
 T
2
 + Q 2.2 0.8 0.08 0.10 
IDV(4) T
2
 1.6 1.0 0.04 0.04 
 Q 3.6 1.4 0.04 0.04 
 T
2
 + Q 5.0 2.2 0.04 0.04 
IDV(10) T
2
 1.2 0.2 0.72 0.74 
 Q 3.0 1.2 0.46 0.48 
 T
2
 + Q 3.8 1.8 0.46 0.48 
IDV(14) T
2
 0.2 0.0 0.10 0.12 
 Q 3.2 1.6 0.06 0.08 
 T
2
 + Q 3.4 1.8 0.06 0.08 
IDV(12+15) T
2
 1.2 0.0 0.30 0.30 
 Q 1.0 0.0 0.54 0.62 
 T
2
 + Q 1.2 0.0 0.30 0.30 
Average  2.2 0.8 0.23 0.24 
 
 
